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INTRODUCTION
Abortion has been the flag in the middle of a tug of war that has
lasted for over fifty years: an issue neither side of the aisle has been
able to pull across the center or willing to put down. However, even
though the “constitutional standards for state regulations affecting a
woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy are not stable, they
have not been changed, at least not yet.”1 Abortion is undoubtedly a
politically polarizing topic in the United States, and recently abortion
foes have made significant political gains. 2 Numerous states, including
Indiana, are purposefully passing blatantly unconstitutional

 J.D. candidate, December 2021, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; MPH candidate, May 2022, University of Illinois at
Chicago School of Public Health; B.S., May 2018 Community Health, Indiana
University Bloomington.
1 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box 991 F.3d 740, 741 (7th Cir.
2021).
2 See Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494, 2495 (2021); see
also Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 277 (5th Cir. 2019).
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legislation.3 These legislative bodies continue to challenge the
abortion standard set forth by the Supreme Court, which has led to a
wave of abortion litigation. Unfortunately, the courts are not
discouraging this trend.
On the contrary, the Supreme Court encourages this behavior
from legislators by continuing to grant certiorari on abortion cases,
sending the message that the standard is not static and legislatures can
mess with it.4 As a result, legislatures, just like the State of Indiana,
continue to knowingly pass unconstitutional abortion restrictions,
knowing abortion clinics will race to court to obtain an injunction,
which would force the federal judiciary to step in and safeguard
abortion rights. Then, politicians have the opportunity to rally against
the court’s ruling for their political gain. Finally, at the next legislative
session, legislatures would start all over again, unrelenting in their
unbroken cycle of anti-abortion attacks that have yet to result in the
prohibition of abortion.
This same cycle occurred with Planned Parenthood of Indiana &
Kentucky, Inc. v. Box.5 Planned Parenthood raced to the court to
obtain an injunction to stop Indiana’s legislatures’ Act 404, which
places an additional requirement on a minor seeking abortion
restricting the right to access abortion, from going into effect. Each
time the Supreme Court adds to its abortion jurisprudence and tinkers
with the standard of the right to abortion, states take it as a sign to
attempt to get more restrictive abortion legislation through the court
system and into law. Therefore, the cycle keeps going.

3

Jackson, 141 S. Ct. at 2495. (Challenge to Texas SB8 banning abortions after
six weeks in direct conflict with the Supreme Court abortion standard); see also
Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 277 (Mississippi law banning abortions after fifteen weeks in
direct conflict with the Supreme Court abortion standard).
4 See Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 277 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in part, 141 S. Ct.
2619, 209 L. Ed. 2d 748 (2021) (The district court and circuit court determined that
the abortion restriction enacted by Mississippi legislatures was facially
unconstitutional because it directly conflicted with Casey, yet the Supreme Court
grated certiorari).
5 991 F.3d at 741.
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Not only does the Supreme Court stimulate controversy when
continuing to take on abortion cases, but each new decision added to
the Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence only confuses the standard
of the right to abortion. Even if the Supreme Court has consistently
reaffirmed the fundamental right to abortion, continually altering the
right to allow for new limits and restrictions makes the standard harder
for the lower courts and circuits to apply and be consistent.
Constitutional rights are supposed to be uniform throughout the
nation.6 However, the Supreme Court’s latest decision in June Medical
Services L.L.C. v. Russo7 makes finding consistency and clarity in the
constitutional right to access abortion nearly impossible. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in June Medical, a near-identical case to
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellersted, decided just three years earlier.8
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court balanced the benefits
and burdens of the abortion restriction at issue, which determined that
the restriction was unconstitutional. However, a more conservative
Supreme Court published a plurality decision on the June Medical
abortion restriction that tracked nearly word for word the Whole
Woman’s Health restriction the Supreme Court struck down three years
earlier.
When the Supreme Court comes down in a plurality opinion, that
opinion still has precedential effects. In Marks v. United States,9 the
Supreme Court created the Marks Rule instructing lower courts to
ascertain precedential effect in the narrowest common denominator of
a plurality holding. Therefore, when the Supreme Court decided June
Medical as a plurality, it handed down the opinion knowing lower
courts would need to navigate the Marks Rule to determine the
6

See Evan Bernick, The Circuit Splits Are Out There—and the Court Should
Resolve Them, 16 ENGAGE 2 (2015); see also Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and
Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decision making, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994) (“Both the Constitution’s framers and the Supreme
Court have stressed that the articulation of nationally uniform interpretations of
federal law is an important objective of the federal adjudicatory process.”)
7 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2141 (2020).
8 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016).
9 430 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1977).
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binding effect of the plurality and the appropriate abortion standard to
use when laws challenging the right to abortion would inevitably come
forward.
However, using the Marks Rule to determine a controlling
opinion10 has been deemed a “vexing task” by many lower circuits,
including the Seventh Circuit, and using the Marks Rule to determine
the controlling opinion in June Medical’s plurality is already plaguing
lower court judges across the nation, creating variation and
unreliability in access to reproductive rights by jurisdiction. For
example, circuits differ from holding that June Medical left the right to
abortion unchanged,11requiring a standard balancing the benefits and
burdens of laws restricting abortion, to determining the plurality
opinion overruled Whole Woman Health,12 restricting the standard to
only looking at the burdens.
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided June Medical, it then
remanded Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Box,
back to the Seventh Circuit for review in light of the plurality opinion.
There, the Seventh Circuit was required to take on the task of
interpreting the Marks Rule as it applies to June Medical. This case
highlights the tremendous amount of variation in the interpretation of
the Marks Rule and how this variation is the difference between
Indiana’s Act 404 and other pieces of legislation like it, passing
constitutional muster and going into effect to restrict abortion access
the Act failing to do so. This inconsistency in the application of the
Marks Rule leads to instability in constitutional rights themselves. 13
The variation in determining the precedential weight of June Medical
has severe practical implications on the right to abortion as a whole

10

EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Friedlander, 978 F.3d 418, 431 (6th
Cir. 2020).
11 Box, 991 F.3d at 741; EMW, 978 F.3d at 431.
12 Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020).
13 See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771–72 (2018).
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and especially for those most impacted by restrictive abortion laws,
the young and the poor.14
The Seventh Circuit majority’s interpretation of the Marks Rule is
correct. After applying the Marks Rule, the Seventh Circuit
determined that June Medical did not overrule Whole Woman’s Health
or change the right to abortion. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed its prior ruling using the Whole Woman’s Health balancing
standard to grant a preliminary injunction against the Indiana State
Statute Act 404,15 which placed significant obstacles in the way of
unemancipated minors seeking abortions. 16
This first part of the article will discuss the background of
Planned Parenthood v. Box, the history of the Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence, and how the Marks Rule interprets plurality
opinions. The second part will discuss why the Seventh Circuit’s
interpretation is correct. Finally, the third part will discuss what to
expect in the coming term and the more significant issue at play.
SETTING THE SCENE FOR INCONSISTENCY IN THE
RIGHT TO ABORTION
A. The Facts of Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky v. Box.
Unintended pregnancy is always a delicate situation, especially
when it involves teenagers. The Supreme Court recognized the
delicacy of these situations in the 1978 case of Bellotti v. Baird,17
where the Supreme Court specifically extended the constitutional right
of privacy and liberty established in Roe v. Wade to minors.18 More
specifically, in Bellotti, the Supreme Court held “if a state requires a
14

Michele McKeegan., The Politics of Abortion: A Historical Perspective. 3
Women's Health Issues. 127, 131 (1993).
15 Ind. Code § 16-34-2-4(e) (2021).
16 Box, 991 F.3d at 740.
17443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (The Supreme Court has announced clear
bypass requirements for parental consent requirements); Box v. Planned Parenthood
of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 187, 207 2020).
18 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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pregnant minor to obtain the consent of one or both parents, another
alternative option must be available for the minor to receive the
abortion.19 The alternative process has four requirements: (1) the
minor is permitted to demonstrate her maturity and informed decision
making on having the abortion without parental consent, (2) if the
minor does not prove maturity, she can convince the judge that the
abortion would be the best decision for her (3) the minor must remain
anonymous, and (4) the process must be expedited to ensure the
abortion will be possible to obtain. 20
“Consistent with Bellotti, Indiana statutes have long provided a
fast and confidential judicial bypass procedure that is supposed to
allow a small fraction of pregnant, unemancipated minors seeking
abortions to obtain them without the consent of or notice to their
parents, guardians, or custodians.”21 Initially, the judicial bypass
process in Indiana required a minor seeking an abortion without
parental consent first to find her way to a state trial court. Then
secondly, the trial court must find that the abortion would be in the
minor’s best interests or that the minor is sufficiently mature to make
their own decision.22 After those two steps, the minor was allowed a
confidential abortion.
However, Indiana Senate enrolled Act 404, which changed the
judicial bypass process. Act 404 would make Indiana an outlier; the
only state requiring a parental notification after a judicial bypass
procedure has already deemed the minor mature enough to make the
decision themselves, as required under Bellotti.23 Act 404 changed the
judicial bypass process by adding a new “notification requirement”
triggered after the judge approves the abortion for the minor. 24 The
Act, if deemed constitutional, would require the minor’s parents to be
19

Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644.
Id. at 797 (“A child, merely on account of [their] minority, is not beyond the
protection of the Constitution.”)
21 Box, 141 S. Ct. at 207.
22 Ind. Code § 16-34-2-4(e) (2021).
23 443 U.S. at 797.
24 Box, 991 F.3d at 740.
20

6

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/2

6

Catalano: The Marks Rule Misses the Mark: How the Seventh Circuit Correctly

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

notified that she is seeking an abortion through the bypass procedure
unless the court finds the notification contrary to the best interest of
the minor. (After a judge determines a minor can make the abortion
decision, the law would still require the parents of the minor to be
notified before the abortion takes place.) It is important to highlight
that Act 404 only provides the best interest exception to this
notification requirement, purposely leaving out the ability for the
judge to decide based on maturity that the parents do not need to be
notified.25 This additional notification requirement, which does not
consider the minor’s maturity, effectively limits minors’ privacy and
access to confidential abortions.
The first time Planned Parenthood v. Box26 came to the Seventh
Circuit from the Southern District of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit
applied the undue burden standard as used in Whole Woman’s Health,
comparing the benefits of the legislation to its burdens against persons
seeking abortions.27 As a result, the Seventh Circuit granted a
preliminary injunction stopping Act 404’s manipulation of the judicial
procedure from going into effect. After that decision, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the defendantsappellants, petitioned the Seventh Circuit for rehearing and rehearing
en banc, which the Seventh Circuit denied. Then the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana petitioned for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari,
vacated the Seventh Circuit’s decision, and remanded for further
consideration in light of June Medical.28
On remand, an important question for the Seventh Circuit panel
was how to apply the “narrowest ground” rule announced in Marks v.

25

Ind. Code § 16-34-2-4(d) (2021).
Planned Parenthood, 141 S. Ct. at 207.
27 Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318; Compare Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
28 June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2113; Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana &
Kentucky, Inc., 591 U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 187, 188 (2020).
26
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United States29 for discerning the precedential force of Supreme Court
decisions issued without a majority opinion (referred to throughout
this Note as the Marks Rule). The Seventh Circuit correctly concluded
that the plurality holding in June Medical did not overrule the
precedential effect of Whole Woman’s Health, as it applies to the
instant case. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit correctly affirmed the
preliminary injunction against Act 404 because Act 404 was
substantially likely to be unconstitutional and violate the requirements
outlined in Bellotti.30 To understand what and why the Seventh Circuit
came out the way it did and the Marks Rule’s impact on access to
abortion rights, it is essential to look at both the history of abortion in
the United States and the history of the Marks Rule.
B. History of Abortion
The Supreme Court established the constitutional right to abortion
in 1973 with the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade.31 However, the
history of abortion began well before that. Abortion has been a
widespread practice as solidly rooted in our past as in the present. 32
Since the 1600s, people around the world have used abortion to
control their reproduction in every known society — regardless of its
legality. For a long time, abortion was a “common and legalized”33
practice in the United States.
It was not until the 19th century that the war on reproductive rights
truly began, with the first known abortion restriction law passed in
England in 1803.34 After that, more anti-abortion laws started to
follow, and by the end of the 19th-century, most states in the U.S.
29

430 U.S. 188 (1977).
Box, 991 F.3d at 752.
31 410 U.S. at 113.
32 Zoila Acevedo, Abortion in early America. 4 Women & Health, 159–167,
(1979).
33 Roe, 410 U.S. at 132. ([i]t is undisputed that at common law, abortion
performed before “quickening”-the first recognizable movement of the fetus in
utero.)
34 Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803).
30
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adopted laws banning abortion except to save the life or health of a
pregnant person.35 Then, in 1873 Congress passed the Comstock
Laws, which banned the publication and dissemination of information
about birth control.36
1. The Right to Abortion Rooted in the Right to Privacy
In response to those abusive legislative blockades threatening
reproductive health, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut37
in 1965 recognized the Bill of Rights having a “penumbra” of
guarantees including the right to privacy for individuals in deciding
matters “so intimate and personal as childbearing.” 38 This case applied
to the right of promotion and use of contraceptive birth control for
married women. However, the case most notably established the
constitutional right of privacy in the realm of reproductive rights. The
penumbra of rights first recognized in Griswold, namely the right of
personal privacy, would also serve as the basis for a woman’s right to
their body and their reproductive decisions, including the right to
abortion.39
Eight years after Griswold, in 1973, the Supreme Court decided
Roe v. Wade, which solidified the right to privacy as it applied to a
35See

Cyril C. Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Status of the Fetus, A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 1664,
1968, (1968). (By the turn of the 20th century, almost every state classified abortion
as a felony, with some states including limited exceptions for medical emergencies
and cases of rape and incest.); see also Connecticut § 19a-600, et seq. (Connecticut’s
first abortion restriction passed in 1821); see also Missouri Stands for the Unborn
Act § § 188.056, 188.057, and 188.058 (Missouri’s first abortion restrictions enacted
in 1825); see also Illinois in 1827; and New York in 1829.
36 See 42 Cong. Ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873); see also Peter Smith, The History
and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 49 Cornell L.Q. 275, 275-76
(1964).
37 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
38 Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
39 See Professor Cheryl E. Amana Burris, J.D., LL.M., Reproductive Rights
Under Attack: Can the Fundamentals of Roe Survive? 8 Biotechnology &
Pharmaceutical L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015).
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woman’s decision to birth a child.40 The essential principles of Roe
established for the first time that abortion restrictions implicated an
unenumerated, fundamental right to personal privacy grounded in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.41 In addition, the
Court developed a trimester system.42 The system prohibited state
interference with a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy during
the first trimester, which left abortion decisions to be made only
between a patient and their attending physician.43 After the first
trimester, states could enact abortion regulations reasonably related to
maternal health. Then, only in the third trimester after a fetus reached
the point of “viability” did a state’s interest in potential life become so
compelling to allow states to go as far as prohibiting abortion except
for saving the mother’s life.44
Importantly, since the Supreme Court found the right to abortion
through the fundamental right of privacy, courts evaluated legislative
challenges to the right under strict scrutiny. 45 Thus, Roe provided the
most protection to date for the right to abortion.46 While many scholars
think the Supreme Court in 1973 took the abortion issue away from
voters and should have allowed the democratic process to handle this
issue itself, 47 the Court stepped in and created constitutional
40

Roe, 410 U.S. at 129. (“Personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to
be protected by the Bill of Rights.”)
41 Id. at 129 (The right to abortion was encompassed in the penumbra of rights
first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut.); see Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
42 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id at. 155; Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir.2004)
(Under the strict scrutiny standard, a law “must serve a compelling government
interest and must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”)
46

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153,155.

47

Jackson Women's Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 277 (5th Cir. 2019)
(James C. Ho, Concurring) (Nothing in the text or original understanding of the
Constitution establishes a right to an abortion. Rather, what distinguishes abortion
from other matters of health care policy in America—and uniquely removes abortion

10
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protection for abortion. Nevertheless, the creation of this right was not
the Court’s fatal flaw rather, the wishy-washy decisions going back
and forth on the standard of the right to abortion that followed Roe are.
These subsequent decisions continued to reshape the right to abortion
and have never allowed the dust to settle, making the issue as
contentious today as when the Supreme Court decided Roe fifty years
ago.
2. Chipping Away at Roe: Casey and the Undue Burden Standard
In 1992, nearly 20 years later, the Supreme Court created the
“undue burden standard” in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.48 Casey reaffirmed the principles of Roe giving
deference to stare decisis respecting settled precedent49 and upholding
the “promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter.”50 Implicit in that
promise is the “right of an individual ... to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”51
However, Casey’s allegiance to Roe was selective — the joint
opinion deferred to certain aspects of Roe while abandoning others. 52
The Supreme Court took a major step back by identifying the right to
abortion as a protected liberty rather than a fundamental right to
policy from the democratic process established by our Founders—is Supreme Court
precedent.); Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v.
Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL 85,
162–63 (2005) (The Supreme Court made the abortion debate more divisive because
it prevented resolution through the normal give and take of political and legislative
discourse and decision.); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Roe v. Wade: Speaking the
Unspeakable, in Robert P. George, Great Cases in Constitutional Law 182 (2000).
48 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
49 Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States,
12 NEV. L.J. 787, 789 (2012) (Put roughly, stare decisis refers to the practice of a
court deferring to some set of precedent).
50 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (plurality opinion).
51 Id. at 851–52, (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453.)
52 Id.
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privacy. As a result, the strict scrutiny standard of review no longer
applied.53 In doing so, the Court significantly changed the abortion
landscape and created an entirely new framework. 54 The Court held
that the “undue burden” standard prohibits any state laws that have the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of a
woman seeking a pre-viability abortion.”55 The undue burden standard
instructed lower courts to look at the burdens abortion restriction
placed on the right to access abortion, and any such law imposing an
undue burden on the right was therefore unconstitutional.56 This new
standard allowed states broader authority, and legislators across the
country took advantage of it by enacting a steady stream of abortion
restrictions and regulations that would slowly strangle access to
abortion.57
For example, there were five provisions of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982 under review in Casey. However, the
Supreme Court found that only the spousal notification requirement
imposed an undue burden on a woman accessing abortion and was
unconditionally invalid.58 Three justices crafted and authored the
Casey opinion: O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter; because Justice
Blackmun dissented, stating he would have applied Roe’s strict
scrutiny and invalidated all five provisions.
It would seem Casey created a plurality opinion, similar to the
current issue with June Medical’s plurality. But the court, not wanting
53

Id. at 876
Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134 HARVARD L. REV.
308 (2020) Available: https://harvardlawreview.org/2020/11/the-symbiosis-ofabortion-and-precedent/.
55 Id., at 878, 112 S.Ct. 2791
56 Id. at 876.
57 See Serena Mayeri, Opinion, How Abortion Rights Will Die a Death by
1,000 Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (2018) (“As abortion-rights leaders feared, Casey’s undue
burden standard allowed more restrictions than Roe. Many states have enacted laws
that drastically limit access to reproductive health care, particularly for poor, rural
and immigrant women who cannot afford to miss work and make repeated trips to
clinics hundreds of miles away.”)
58 Id. at 887-95.
54

12

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/2

12

Catalano: The Marks Rule Misses the Mark: How the Seventh Circuit Correctly

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

confusion in the application of its holding, invoked the Marks Rule
itself, explicitly instructing the parties and the lower courts on how to
read Casey properly. Thus, Justice Souter stated, “[f]or the purposes of
this opinion, I join the applicants and the courts below in treating the
joint opinion in Casey as controlling, as the statement of the Members
of the Court who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds.”59 However, this distinction between Blackmun’s dissent and
the majority serves a purpose; it highlighted the Roe and Casey
standards differences. Significantly more restrictive abortion laws
passed muster under the new Casey standard than Roe’s standard.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court would not stop there, and the Casey
“undue burden standard” would not be the last time the Supreme Court
would modify the standard of the right to abortion.
3. Adding Protection: Whole Woman’s Health and Weighing the
Benefits and Burdens
In 2016, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt reaffirmed the
“undue burden” standard.60 However, the majority, consisting of
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, applied
the Casey undue burden standard a little more broadly by considering
the burdens a law imposed on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws conferred.61 This balancing of the burdens
compared to the benefits helped the Court decipher if states enacted
the legislation to promote safety and address a public health concern
for individuals dealing with an unintended pregnancy or if the law was
just a sham to hinder access to abortion procedures.
In this case, the majority approved a pre-enforcement injunction
against two Texas state laws. The first injunction was on the clause
that required admitting privileges for abortion providers. The second
59

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)(Chief Justice Rehnquist—who dissented in Casey—also later wrote that
he viewed the Casey plurality as binding under Marks).
60 579 US, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016)
61 Id.
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focused on the clause that required abortion clinics to meet
unnecessary hospital-level “safety” standards. The proposed laws
would have effectively shut down most clinics in the State while
providing minimal benefit or improvements in abortion delivery
because the abortion procedures were already incredibly safe. 62 To
date, no majority opinion of the Supreme Court has overruled this
standard.
4. Partisanship and Inconsistency in the Courtroom: June Medical and
the Plurality Decision
Three years later, in 2019, the Supreme Court heard its most
recent abortion case June Medical. It is important to note that within
these three years, Justice Kennedy retired, and the Supreme Court saw
two new additions, Justice Gorsuch63 and Justice Kavanaugh.64 So,
even though the facts of June Medical were identical to Whole
Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court now had more conservativeleaning justices than it did in the time of Whole Woman’s Health.
The Louisiana admitting privileges law in June Medical was
nearly word-for-word the Texas admitting privileges law struck down
in Whole Woman’s Health and had the same effect of shutting down
almost all abortion providers in the state. 65 The only difference was
that the case had much less progressive support, and the Court decided
62

Id. at 970-80.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 74, 76, 135 (2017) (statement of Judge Neil
M. Gorsuch). Judge Gorsuch vowed to analyze cases with respect to the “law of
precedent.”
64 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (Sept. 5, 2018) (statement of Judge Brett M.
Kavanaugh). Judge Kavanaugh assured the Senate Judiciary Committee of his
commitment to precedent, noting that the concept of stare decisis “comes from
Article III itself.”
65 June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2113, 2134
63
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the opinion as a 4-1-4 plurality (i.e., plurality-concurrence-dissent).66
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan considered the burdens
the law imposed on abortion access together with the benefits those
laws conferred, following the standard used in Whole Woman’s
Health.67 On the other end, Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh dissented, believing the Whole Woman’s Health standard
was not appropriate and should be overturned. 68 Chief Justice Roberts
concurred with the majority in his own opinion, striking down the law
purely on the principle of stare decisis, 69 calling for the Court to
adhere to Whole Woman’s Health’s earlier result on the essentially
identical facts.70 Both the plurality and the Chief Justice agreed that
enforcement of the Louisiana law was properly enjoined before it took
effect.
While this was arguably a win for pro-choice supporters, the
plurality decision left many open questions: Namely, what was the
binding authority, and which abortion standard applied? With no
instruction from the Supreme Court,71 it was now up to the lower
courts to answer these questions. To do this, the lower courts utilized
the incongruent Marks Rule. Together, the uncertain abortion standard
and application of the Marks Rule paired with rising legislative attacks
on abortions laws in various states created a recipe for inconsistency.
This recipe created several disagreements among circuits about which
opinion in June Medical was the “narrowest grounds.”
The Seventh Circuit entered this split when it applied its
interpretation of the Marks Rule on remand in Planned Parenthood of
Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Box. 72
66

Id. at 2122–32 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion).
Id.
68 June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2148 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2154–57
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2181 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (joining Justice Alito’s dissent in its discussion of Casey).
69
See, Mead, supra note 44, at 790.
70June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2134, 2139 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
71 See Casey, 510 U.S. at 1309–10 (Souter, J., in chambers). Unlike in Casey
plurality specifically told the lower courts the holding to use.
72 991 F.3d 740, 741 (7th Cir. 2021).
67
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C. The Marks Rule Leading to Inconsistency in Reproductive Rights
The Supreme Court required the Seventh Circuit to rely on the
Marks “narrowest grounds” Rule to understand June Medical’s
holding and precedential force.73 The issue with this instruction is that
the Marks Rule is notoriously vague and incongruent in its
application.74 As a result, circuits across the nation used different
approaches or even the same approach and came to different outcomes
to determine the precedential effect. This variation has resulted in
applying different abortion standards and has made the right to
abortion differ by jurisdiction. 75
The Supreme Court held that the Marks Rule is the controlling
Rule for evaluating the precedential effect of its plurality opinions. 76
According to the Marks Rule, “when a fragmented court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’”77
Marks determined that lower courts were required to accord at
least some precedential effect to plurality decisions. Still, the Court
provided little guidance regarding precisely how lower courts should
identify which aspects of those decisions were binding. Thus, the
Marks Rule is far from a perfect solution when dealing with plurality
decisions for various reasons. First, the Rule creates precedent when
there is no clear majority, which can be problematic. As a result, lower
73

Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 448
(1992). Even commentators who have proposed reforms to the Marks doctrine have
sometimes characterized their efforts as “damage control,” viewing the task for
lower courts as making the best of a bad situation the Supreme Court thrust upon
them with its abdication of its institutional responsibility.
75 See, e.g., Evan Bernick supra note 6 at 36.
76 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193
77 Id. quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
74

16

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol17/iss1/2

16

Catalano: The Marks Rule Misses the Mark: How the Seventh Circuit Correctly

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 17

Fall 2021

courts across the country now can interpret the plurality in ways
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s desired intent of the ruling.
Second, the Marks Rule can be highly inefficient and create judicial
instability because of the inconsistent rulings. 78 Finally, the Marks
Rule creates confusion among lower courts because it provides no
guiding framework. Due to the lack of instruction on how lower courts
should implement the Marks Rule, circuits across the country have
created various methods for concluding which is the narrowest
opinion. Each Marks approach analyzes how each justice’s opinion in
a case fits with the others in different ways. The Seventh Circuit
considered three approaches: the logic-subset, the swing-vote, and the
issue-by-issue.
Each approach has a distinct method for ascertaining the
narrowest ground of a plurality, and each has distinct pros and cons.
Lower courts across the country have not been consistent in sticking to
an approach. Rather different circuit panels often adopt different
approaches depending on the particular plurality decision that the
circuit is considering.79 “This doctrinal confusion among lower courts
regarding the proper approach and application of Marks has produced
a series of longstanding circuit splits that have resulted from lower
courts’ disagreements regarding how the narrowest grounds rule
should apply to particular Supreme Court plurality decisions.”80
78

Owen P. Toepfer, June Medical and the Marks Rule, 96 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1725 (2021)
79 Compare, e.g., Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 807
n.17 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Given that [Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005),] was
decided by a plurality, the separate opinion of Justice Breyer, who supplied the
‘decisive fifth vote,’ is controlling under the rule of Marks.”; with, e.g., United
States v. Carrizales Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In practice, . . .
the Marks rule produces a determinate holding ‘only when one opinion is a logical
subset of other, broader opinions.’” (quoting King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc))). Some circuit courts have even commented on this
internal inconsistency. See, e.g., Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC, 792
F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015).
80 see Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and
Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 804–06 (2017); see, e.g., Garland v.
Roy, 615 F.3d 391, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2010) Identifying a four-way circuit split
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1. The Logic-Subset Approach
The logic-subset, “implicit consensus,” or “common
denominator” approach is frequently utilized in circuit courts.
According to the logic-subset approach, the Mark’s narrowest ground
rule applies only “where it is clear that one opinion would apply in a
subset of cases encompassed by a broader opinion such that ‘the
rationales for the majority outcome are nested, fitting within each
other like Russian dolls.”81 When the reasoning underlying the
decisive concurring opinion fails to fit within a broader logical circle
drawn by the other opinions or is not within the nesting doll, Marks
does not apply.82 Therefore, under this approach, a Supreme Court
decision is only binding when a single line of reasoning enjoys the
assent of a majority of the justices. Only the reasoning enjoined by a
majority is the lowest common denominator of a majority of the
justices’ rationales.83 In the simplest scenario, four justices agree on
ground A and B for the judgment, and the one justice concurs only on
ground A but not ground B. In such a case, the concurring opinion onground A is the rationale that provides the narrowest ground and is
thereby controlling.84

regarding application of Marks to United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), and
rejecting all four in favor of a fifth distinct approach; see also Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
81 King, 950 F.2d at 781 (“Marks is workable . . . only when one opinion is a
logical subset of other, broader opinions.”).
82Id. at 782; accord, United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179,
189 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that where no single standard “constitutes the
narrowest ground for a decision on that issue, there is then no law of the land”).
83 See Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d at 189.
84 Box, 978 F.3d at 476.
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Figure 1 Gregg v. Georgia Plurality

For example, in Gregg v. Georgia,85 the Court, considering the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty, published another fragmented
opinion. The Court treated the concurring opinion of Justices Stewart
and White as controlling.86 The opinions fell in a single line of
reasoning with Justices Marshall and Brennan as the inner smallest
nesting doll, having the most restrictive opinion, believing the death
penalty is unconstitutional in all circumstances. Then, Justice Stewart
and White’s opinion was the middle nesting doll, believing the death
penalty is unconstitutional when administered arbitrarily and
capriciously. Last, Justice Douglas’s opinion was the outer nesting
doll, who insisted that any discretion is for the judge or jury to decide
when to impose capital punishment. Therefore, Justice Stewart and
White’s opinion was the binding precedent because the most
85
86

428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
See id.
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restrictive opinion (Justice Marshall and Brennan) would fit within it,
and the broadest opinion would also agree with it to some extent.87
Overall, Gregg is an example of when it is relatively unproblematic to
apply the Marks Rule.

Figure 2 McDonald v. City of Chicago Plurality

In contrast, the Marks Rule would not apply under the logicsubset approach when choosing one opinion as the narrowest ground
would produce a holding that a majority of justices would not have
endorsed. For example, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,88 the Court
determined whether the Second Amendment was incorporated through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities or Due
Process clauses. Justice Alito’s plurality advocated that the right was
incorporated through the Due Process Clause but not incorporated
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In contrast, Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment but held the right was incorporated
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not through the Due
Process Clause. Then, the two dissenting positions determined that the
right was not incorporated through either the Due Process or Privileges
87

See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
88 561 U.S. 742, 745 (2010).
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and Immunities Clauses. The opinions overlap in some sense but also
diverge in others, making it impossible for the opinions to order in a
nested manner.89 Thus, in an instance like McDonald, the Marks logicsubset approach could not apply. The Marks Rule does not require the
court to find common ground –it only requires that when it does, the
Marks Rule can apply.90 Therefore, if there is no common
denominator, the Marks Rule is inappropriate, and no binding
precedent can be applied.

Figure 3: June Medical Plurality

Like Gregg, the opinions in June Medical are in a single line of
reasoning that enjoys the assent of a majority of the justices. The
Justices merely disagree over how restrictive the right to abortion is.
All justices’ opinions fell on that spectrum, nesting from the most
restrictive, the inner nesting doll, to the least restrictive, the outer
nesting doll. Specifically, Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion is broadest
because it protects the right to abortion the most by upholding the
Casey undue burden standard with Whole Woman’s Health burden89

David S. Cohen, The Paradox of McDonald v. City of Chicago, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. Arguendo 1A (2011).
90 Box, 978 F.3d at 43.
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benefit balance. But the varying dissenting opinions are the most
restrictive to the right with the least protection. Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion is the middle ground, believing the law should be struck down
on stare decisis grounds. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is
logically nested within the plurality’s opinion of the standard.
The logic-subset approach to the Marks Rule applies to June
Medical. However, there is a dispute as to the outcome of that
approach. Circuits have come out with three different outcomes using
the logic-subset approach: 1) there is no binding precedent in June
Medical, 2) Chief Justice Roberts’s entire opinion controls, and 3) that
Whole Woman’s Health was entitled to stare decisis effect was the
only holding.91
For example, the Fifth Circuit in Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton
concluded that no opinion represented a logic-subset of the other and
that Hellerstedt’s cost-benefit test still governed. 92 The Fifth Circuit
determined that the only common denominator between the plurality
and the concurrence in June Medical was their shared conclusion that
the challenged Louisiana law constituted an undue burden, further
stating that the decision did not furnish a new controlling rule as to
how to perform the undue burden test. Therefore, the Whole Woman’s
Health formulation of the test continues to govern all abortion cases,
which means that the undue burden plus benefit and burden analysis
would still be the appropriate standard.
However, the Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, vacated
the initial opinion, and reversed. The Fifth Circuit en banc reasoned
that Chief Justice Robert’s entire opinion is the binding precedent in
the case because “So the Chief Justice’s test is a narrower version
(only burdens) of the plurality’s test (benefits and burdens).

91

See EMW, 960 F.3d at 796 (“Like other courts presented with this argument,
we find it unpersuasive.”); W. Ala. Women's Ctr. v. Williamson, 900 F.3d 1310,
1326 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The State cites no support for the proposition that a different
version of the undue burden test applies to a law regulating abortion facilities.”)
92 See Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 972 F.3d 649, 652–53 (5th Cir.
2020).
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Accordingly, the Chief Justice’s concurrence controls, and we do not
balance the benefits and burdens in assessing an abortion regulation. 93
Further, the Sixth Circuit is currently in disagreement with itself
over the holding of June Medical. The Sixth Circuit used the logicsubset approach in EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., PSC v. Friedlander,94
the court found that Chief Justice Roberts’s entire concurrence was
binding.95 EMW involved a Kentucky law requiring that abortion
providers obtain transfer and transport agreements with local hospitals
and ambulance services. A divided panel found that Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurrence was binding under Marks and vacated an
injunction against Kentucky law enforcement. 96 Reasoning that
because all laws invalid under the Chief Justice’s rationale (the middle
nesting doll) are invalid under the plurality’s (the outer nesting doll),
but not all laws invalid under the plurality’s rationale are invalid under
the Chief Justice’s, the Chief Justice’s position is the narrowest under
the Marks Rule. EMW’s holding was very contentious within the
circuit panel.97 The dissent argued that “the majority openly
disregarded the circuit’s standard of review and discarded binding
precedent. In doing so, the majority in the sixth circuit condoned the
evisceration of the constitutional right to abortion access in
Kentucky.”98

93

Paxton, No. 17-51060 WL 3661318 (5th Cir. Aug. 18, 2021).
F.3d at 431.
95
Id.
96 EMW, 978 F.3d at 433.
97 Id. at 438 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“At the end of the day, no matter what
standard this Court is bound to apply, the majority's decision today is terribly and
tragically wrong. The majority directly contravenes both the plurality and concurring
opinions in June Medical Services, as well as the majority opinion in Whole
Woman's Health. Correctly analyzed, the record and the law definitively demonstrate
that Kentucky's transfer and transport agreement requirements impose an undue
burden under any possible analysis. And the consequences of today's decision could
not be more dire. As a result of the majority's deeply flawed analysis, millions of
individuals will be altogether deprived of abortion access.”)
98 Id.
94978
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Instead, the dissent which utilized the same logic-subset approach
would have upheld Whole Woman’s Health. Stating that even if the
Chief Roberts’ Justice’s concurrence in June Medical was the
controlling opinion from that case— his critique of the balancing
approach was mere dicta because Chief Justice Roberts based his
opinion on stare decisis. Thus, the dissent determined that the
narrowest ground between the plurality and the concurrence was only
that Whole Woman’s Health was entitled to stare decisis effect on
essentially identical facts.99 The dissents holding resulted in the Whole
Woman’s Health standard, where the burdens and benefits of the law at
issue are balances.100
The dissenting opinion in EMW is not the only opinion taking
issue with the majority analysis. Additionally, in Bristol Regional
Women’s Center., P.C. v. Slatery,101 a case involving a Tennessee
statute that imposes a waiting period of 24-48 hours on women
seeking an abortion in the State, the court expressed grave doubt as to
the precedential effect of the EMW majority opinion. The court
suggested the panel’s choice between the two standards was entirely
dicta102 because it was not necessary to determine the issue on appeal
and is therefore not binding on the circuit. 103

99

June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2120 (plurality); id. at 2139 (concurrence).
See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318; See EMW, 978 F.3d at 470.
101 No. 20-6267, 2021 WL 650893, at 14 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) (Thapar, J.,
dissenting).
102 United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 410–11, 413 (6th Cir. 2008)
(Holding an earlier opinion to be dicta insofar as it chose between a probable cause
and a "lesser reasonable belief standard" for the quantum of proof needed for police
officers to enter a residence and execute a search warrant where the facts of the
earlier case were such that either standard would have been satisfied).
103 Slatery, No. 20-6267, 2021 WL 650893, at 14 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2021)
("Given a choice between Casey and Whole Woman’s Health standards would not
have change the outcome of the EMW case due to the nature of the underlying
facts”).
100
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2. The Swing-Vote Approach
Next, the swing-vote or “median” approach essentially views
Marks as an instruction to search for the opinion reflecting the views
of the Court’s median or “swing” justice—typically, the fifth vote and
accord that decision full precedential effect. 104 Therefore, to locate the
narrowest grounds, a lower court looks to justice’s opinion, which was
necessary to secure a majority. Meaning the controlling opinion could
reflect the view of only one justice.105 Lower courts justify using this
approach under two schools of thought: (1) assessing the predictive
value of future similar cases, assuming the Court will likely be able to
muster five votes only for the rationale taken by the “fifth justice” in
the earlier case106, and (2) considering the forced-to-choose rationale,
which assumes that the swing vote justice’s opinion would be the
preferred outcome of the Court if it were required to settle on one
view.107
Although this approach does not require the opinions to be
“nested,” this approach requires opinions to be based on a single
dimension of the opinions.108 There needs to be a middle ground
opinion to determine the plurality’s preferred precedential outcome. It
would be impossible to identify a single opinion reflecting the justices’
median position if the opinions, like in McDonald v. Chicago, were in
104

See Williams, supra note 79, at 806.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 694.
106 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 548
(1998) (book review) Contending that a “rational lower court” attempting to use a
prior Supreme Court plurality decision to predict the Court’s future decisions “will
simply find the position of the fifth Justice and treat this as the law.”
107 See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Process: A Social Choice
Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making 45, 124-41 (2000) (arguing that a fifth
vote approach to the Marks rule—that is, one that accords controlling significance to
the views of the Court’s median Justice—will identify a Condorcet winner in most
plurality decisions.)
108 Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases)); Whole
Woman's Health All. v. Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d 694, 732 (S.D. Ind. 2020), order
clarified sub nom.
105
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effect multiple distinct “majorities” composed of different justices
who do not share a common ranking for the available options. 109
This approach is relatively broader than the logic-subset approach
but is not without its critiques—and for a good reason. There are two
main criticisms of the swing vote approach. First, this approach treats
as binding every aspect of the opinion reflecting the median justice’s
views, even if no other participating justice would have agreed.
Second, the approach allows the dissenting opinions to have potential
precedential effect by considering their point of view when searching
for the middle opinion, even though Marks explicitly wrote in terms of
“those Members who concurred in the judgments.” 110 Despite these
criticisms, the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have all toyed with
this approach to some extent. 111
The paradigmatic case the swing vote approach would apply is the
4–1–4 case. The swing-vote approach could apply to June Medical
because it is a 4-1-4 case, and all the opinions fall on a spectrum of
views as required, with Chief Justice Robert’s concurrence in the
middle of the plurality and dissent. 112 Under this approach, it would be
likely that the Chief Justice’s entire concurring opinion would be
binding. Thus, the Casey undue burden standard would apply
effectively, overruling the Whole Woman’s Health standard weighing
the benefits and burdens of the law in question. This holding aligns
with the swing votes approach’s understanding that if forced to choose
among the remaining opinions, both the plurality and dissent would
109

See Williams, supra note 79, at 804–06. If forced to choose among each of
the remaining opinions, those writing or joining the opinions at the outer edge” of
this continuum “would most prefer the one closest to them and least prefer the one
farthest from them.”
110 Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.) This is also in
contention with precedent case law and scholarly view that Marks does not count in
any sense the dissenting opinions.
111 See United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“In most cases, the
commonsense way to apply Marks is to identify and follow the opinion that occupies
the middle ground between (i) the broader opinion supporting the judgment and (ii)
the dissenting opinion.”
112 June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2120 (Breyer, J., plurality)
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choose Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion. However, applying this
version of the Marks Rule highlights the main criticisms of the swingvote approach. First, using this approach would create a binding
precedent entirely on the view of a single justice, which is worrisome.
It should not be possible that lower courts can determine that one
justice’s opinion can overrule a true majority opinion by a mere
interpretation.113
3. Issue-by-Issue Approach
In this approach, the key is not what opinion is “narrowest,” but
which legal issues get at least five affirmative votes. This approach
considers every opinion, including those dissenting from the majority.
Then within each opinion, anything that receives the endorsement of at
least five justices is binding.114 This approach only applies to a limited
type of plurality decision, mainly cases with “dual majority.”115 Where
“there are in effect two majorities: the plurality and concurrence
agreeing on the result, and the concurrence and dissent agreeing on the
fundamental legal principles involved. 116 There must be points where
the opinions agree for any part of the opinion to have five votes.
A positive effect of this approach is that it avoids the uneasy
conclusion that a single justice’s view can establish a binding
precedent for the Court, unlike the swing vote approach. Instead, this
approach looks for specific parts of the opinions that at least five
justices have assented. However, there are also negative repercussions
that stem from this approach. As the swing vote approach, this method
is in contention with the Mark’s Rule’s notion that the dissenting
opinions should not be counted or be able to potentially bind future

113

See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1402–03.
See Williams, supra note 79, at 817–19.
115 Id. at 819
116 Id.
114
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cases,117 which has led to some circuits expressly disavowing the
approach entirely.118
Courts use this approach mostly when they cannot find the
narrowest opinion under either logic-subset or the swing vote
approaches.119 For example, the Eighth Circuit in Hopkins v. Jegley120
held that Chief Justice Roberts’s entire concurrence In June Medical
was binding. The court did not specify which approach they were
using to define the narrowest holding in June Medical nor explained
how it reached its conclusion. However, the language of the case
suggested the court was using an issue-by-issue interpretation. The
court reasoned that because a total of five justices (Robert concurring
and the four dissenting opinions) all rejected the Whole Woman’s
Health cost-benefit standard Whole Woman’s Health was no longer
binding precedent, and the court applied a straight Casey undue
burden standard analysis.
However, it is also possible that a lower court using this approach
with June Medical could find upholding Whole Woman’s Health on the
grounds of stare decisis to be the holding. The four Justice plurality
and Justice Robert’s concurrence give that issue a majority five votes
117

See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters
of the United States” and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y. REV. 1, 14 (2006) (contending that “[n]othing in the dissent” in a
plurality decision “constitutes a portion of the judgment of the Court, so nothing in
the dissent” can be “part of the actual holding of the case” under Marks).
118 See, e.g., Paxton, 972 F.3d at 653 (“[A]ny intimation that the views of
dissenting Justices can be cobbled together with those of a concurring Justice to
create a binding holding must be rejected. That is not the law in this or virtually any
court following common-law principles of judgments.”); United States v. Hughes,
849 F.3d 1008, 1012 (11th Cir. 2017) (“When determining which opinion controls,
we do not ‘consider the positions of those who dissented.’” (quoting United States v.
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007))).
119 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (only after
concluding that a strict application of marks was unworkable for the Rapanos
decision, did the Third Circuit look to the votes of dissenting Justices if they,
combined with votes from plurality or concurring opinions, to established a majority
view on the relevant issue.)
120 968 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2020).
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without considering the dissenting opinions. The applicable standard
to be used would be weighing the benefits and the burdens. Either
way, it is relatively unnecessary since the issue-by-issue approach is
merely a “necessary logical corollary” 121 of Marks when a Marks’
analysis does not find a “narrowest” opinion. Therefore, lower courts
should not use this approach with June Medical given the other
approaches’ applicability.122
As the above cases indicate, the Marks Rule interpretation is
entirely left up to the lower courts to interpret on their terms, which
results in differing standards across the jurisdictions, even when
utilizing the same approach. The lack of standardization in the Marks
Rule allows for a distortion of the right to abortion and comes with
practical consequences, including stimulating even more controversy
around the issue. Like the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit
correctly opted to use the logic-subset approach as it is the best
approach for a plurality opinion such as June Medical, however using
the same approach, the seventh circuit would come to an alternative
outcome.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT ENTERS THE SPLIT
The Seventh Circuit majority came to the proper conclusion
despite the Supreme Court leaving the lower courts “with [their]
previous decision in one hand and a half-dozen June Medical opinions
in the other, figur[ing] out how the latter affects the former.”123
Undoubtedly, each circuit is trying its level best to apply the same
guidance from the Marks Rule to the same set of opinions in June
Medical, yet the varying circuit precedents have made it clear that this
is not so simple a task.124
Unsurprisingly, due to the mass inconsistency in applying the
Marks Rule and the polarized nature of the abortion issue itself, the
121

Duvall, 740 F.3d at 611.
See id. at 611.
123 Box, 991 F.3d at 752
124 See id. at 757.
122
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Seventh Circuit panel was divided two-to-one in the proper application
of the Marks Rule.125 Although the Seventh Circuit was unanimous in
the initial inquiry determining which approach to adopt (the logicsubset approach), the panel disagreed on the second inquiry of what
within that logic-subset is binding. The Seventh Circuit majority
determined that June Medical did not change the standard of abortion
and applied the Whole Woman’s Health balance of burdens and
benefits standard. Despite the majority’s interpretation being a
minority viewpoint among sister circuits, 126 the Seventh Circuit
majority’s interpretation is most consistent with the principles of the
Marks Rule and the doctrine of stare decisis, the grounds on which
Chief Justice Roberts concurred.
A. The Logic-Subset Approach is the Best Approach
First, the panel looked at each of the three approaches discussed
above. The Seventh Circuit’s majority and dissent were unanimous in
choosing the logic-subset approach as the best to determine the
precedential effect of June Medical. The logic-subset approach was a
clear choice for the Seventh Circuit because the June Medical plurality
fits the nesting doll type of plurality that is best suited for this analysis
consistent with the “substantial weight of authority.”127 Even further,
using the logic-subset approach as the majority applied avoided
unwelcome outcomes of the Marks Rule that the alternative
approaches, namely the swing-vote approach, would produce.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the swing-vote approach
as a non-predominant approach in courts across the country.128
Moreover, the swing-vote approach here is inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent, treating as binding every aspect of the opinion
125

Id. at 752.
Id. at 751. The Seventh Circuit “recognize that the scope of June Medical
and the effect of the concurrence has been controversial” and other circuits have
come to an different conclusion, but that is not binding on them. Other circuits are
wrong.
127Id. at 748.
128 Id. at 749.
126
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reflecting the median justice’s view, even if no other participating
justice would have agreed and allowing dissenting opinions to have
potential precedential effect, which goes against Seventh Circuit and
Supreme Court precedent.129 Moreover, the Supreme Court instruction
specifically wrote in terms of only “those Members who concurred in
the judgment.”130 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was left to ascertain
the narrowest grounds between the plurality opinion and Chief
Justice’s Roberts concurring opinion.
B. Where the Panel Disagrees
Although the panel agreed on the logic-subset approach and
agreed not to consider dissenting opinions, the panel disagreed on the
arguable more difficult question: what part of Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence in June Medical constituted the “logic-subset” of the
plurality opinion.131
Both the majority and dissent agree that Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence on the grounds of stare decisis is the controlling opinion
but disagree on what in the concurrence is entitled to stare decisis
effect and within the logic-subset and therefore binding precedent on
the Seventh Circuit. The majority found Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence on the grounds of stare decisis logically applied to the
entire holding of Whole Woman’s Health. The majority refused to hold
that one justice’s opinion effectively overruled Supreme Court
precedent, especially when that opinion is based on the grounds of

129

Gibson, 760 F.3d at 620. F.3d 1043, 1057 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[W]e do not share the reservations of the
D.C. Circuit about combining a dissent with a concurrence to find the ground of
decision embraced by a majority of the Justices.”).
130Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks
v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 Const. Comment. 321, 328
(2000) (It is generally agreed upon, and commonly held in the 7th circuit that the
dissenting opinions do not count when applying the marks rule, and therefore the 7th
circuit would not consider them).
131 Box, 991 F.3d at 754.
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stare decisis.132 In contrast, the dissent opined that only Whole
Woman’s Health’s finding of a substantial obstacle was to be given
stare decisis effect and that the concurrence effectively overruled the
benefit and burden analysis introduced in Whole Woman’s Health. In
consideration of the Marks Rule and the doctrine of stare decisis, the
majority got it right.
C. The Majority’s Interpretation is Correct
1. The Majority’s Approach Limits Unwelcome Outcomes
While the Marks Rule lacks a strong framework, some underlying
principles and critiques follow the Marks Rule and varying
approaches. The majority’s interpretation avoids the unwelcome
outcomes that the swing-vote approach would produce, while the
dissenting opinion rejecting the swing-vote approach essentially
mirrors the swing-vote approach’s outcome.133 Both majority and
dissent agree that dissenters are not considered in the determination of
the common denominator. Therefore, the question of precedential
effect is “between a single justice concurrence, which would arguably
overrule prior precedent (although it does not claim to do so), and a
four-justice plurality, which purports to adhere to prior precedent. 134”
The majority held there was one “sliver” of common ground
between the plurality and Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence, that
Whole Woman’s Health was entitled to stare decisis effect on
essentially identical facts. Further reasoning that the portions of Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinions discussing disapproval with the Whole
Woman’s Health standard were mere dicta, and that Chief Justice
Roberts, himself, does not view the dicta in his concurrence as

132

June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2113, 2134.
991 F.3d at 746–49. Applying the swing-vote test to treat everything in
the concurrence as a binding holding would allow less than a majority to overrule a
Court precedent that had been established by majority vote.
134 See Toepfer, supra note 76, at 1738.
133Box,
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binding.135 The majority specifically noted that the Marks Rule does
not “turn everything the concurrence said—including its stated reasons
for disagreeing with portions of the plurality opinion—into binding
precedent that effectively overruled Whole Woman’s Health,” which is
in line with Supreme Court precedent.
For example, in United States v. Santos,136 “the Supreme Court
split 4-1-4 on the decisive issue. 137 Justice Scalia wrote a plurality
opinion for four justices to affirm; Justice Stevens wrote a separate,
narrower opinion concurring in that judgment. But Justice Stevens’s
concurring opinion expressed views on future cases not before the
Court. The Supreme Court plurality addressed how Marks should
apply. Justice Stevens’s reasoning was the narrowest in support of the
judgment. Still, the plurality flatly rejected the idea that everything in
Justice Stevens’s opinion was binding or directly applicable: “Justice
Stevens’s speculations on that point address a case that is not before
him, are the purest of dicta, and form no part of today’s holding.”138
Just like Stevens in Santos, Roberts’s language in his concurrence in
June Medical discussing Whole Woman’s Health went to a case not
before him at that moment and is the “purest of dicta.”139 The dissent
in Box would have Chief Justice Roberts’s entire concurrence, dicta
and all, overrule Supreme Court precedent.
While there is no significant instruction or precedent on whether a
single justice may overrule prior precedent, the Seventh Circuit
majority seems to agree with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Gorsuch
and their opinion in Ramos v Louisiana.140 In Ramos, the justices cast
doubt on the idea that “a single justice writing only for himself has the

135June

Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (“The question today however is not
whether Whole Woman’s Health was right or wrong, but whether to adhere to it in
deciding the present case.”)
136
553 U.S. 507 (2008).
137 See Box, 991 F.3d at 749
138 Id. at 523.
139 See id.
140 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.)
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authority to bind this Court to propositions it has already rejected. 141”
The majority considered that holding a single justice’s opinion as
binding would not only depart from the Seventh Circuit’s
“predominant understanding of Marks,” but the majority also showed
reservations to the possibility of adopting one justice’s non-majority
opinion as possibly becoming national law.142 Therefore, even if one
justice’s view can be binding in Marks, it becomes even more taboo
when that once justice’s opinion would effectively overrule Supreme
Court precedent.
It is well known that only the Supreme Court can overrule itself,
and they do so sparingly.143 The Supreme Court has overruled itself a
mere 145 times out of the over 25,544 cases it has heard to date, which
means it overrules itself not even one percent of the time. 144 Allowing
a single justice’s opinion to overrule Whole Woman’s Health goes
against well-known legal principal as well as the fabric of American
democracy. No one justice dictates. Therefore, a single justice should
not determine policy and rule for the American people. The majority
appropriately concluded that overruling Supreme Court precedent via
the Marks Rule was “not [its] job.145”
Since a majority of justices of the Supreme Court have not held
otherwise, the Seventh Circuit’s majority concluded that Whole
Woman’s Health remains precedent and is binding on lower courts.
Therefore, the balancing test also remains a binding precedent. That is
141

Id. (“[W]e would have to embrace a new and dubious proposition: that a
single Justice writing only for himself has the authority to bind this Court to
propositions it has already rejected. . . . [N]o case has before suggested that a single
Justice may overrule precedent”).
142See King, 950 F.2d at 782; see also Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 433
n.9 (7th Cir. 2019) (stating that where one Justice's concurring opinion reached the
same result as the plurality opinion, but did so under a different constitutional clause,
that concurring opinion was not a “logical subset” of the plurality opinion).
143 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989).
144 David Schultz, The Supreme Court Has Overturned Precedent Dozens of
Times in the Past 60 Years, Including When It Struck Down Legal Segregation. The
Conversation. (2021).
145 See Box, 991 F.3d at 749.
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the standard the Seventh Circuit followed in the original decision 146
and continued to follow in the instant case. Further, the concurring
opinion offered no direct guidance for applying the undue burden
standard more generally, which signaled to the majority that June
Medical did not overrule Whole Woman’s Health, the dissent
disagreed.
However, the dissenting opinion determining the narrowest
ground as the Chief Justice’s Roberts entire concurrence is in
contention with the well-known legal principle and the principle of
stare decisis itself. To accept the dissents determination of precedential
effect in June Medical suggests that Chief Justice Roberts both
reaffirmed Whole Woman’s Health and, in the same opinion, implicitly
overruled it.
2. Reliance on Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent. Stare
decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles fostering reliance on judicial decisions
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.”147 There are four main factors the Supreme Court considers
when considering overruling Supreme Court precedent: the
workability of a precedent, whether the precedent was well-reasoned,
the age of the precedent, and the reliance interests at stake. 148 Since
Casey, the Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence and stare decisis
have gone hand in hand. Therefore, it is no surprise the Chief Justice
invoked the doctrine in June Medical,149 explaining, “[t]he legal
doctrine of stare decisis requires [the Supreme Court], absent special
circumstances, to treat like cases alike.”
The majority’s application of the Marks Rule aligns most with the
principle of stare decisis. While the Chief Justice wrote that he still
146

See Planned Parenthood, Inc., U.S. 141 S. Ct. at 188.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
148 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009).
149 See Murray supra, note 53 at 308.
147
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disagreed with Whole Woman’s Health, he explained that principles of
stare decisis called for the Supreme Court to adhere to that earlier
result on the essentially identical facts, decided just three years
earlier.150 Both the plurality and the Chief Justice agreed that
enforcement of the Louisiana law was properly enjoined before it took
effect. All the more, the concurring opinion offered no direct guidance
for applying the undue burden standard more generally. The majority
in Box held that the precedential effect only pertained to reaffirming
Whole Woman’s Health because stating the case is upheld pursuant to
stare decisis and then effectively overruling is nonsensical.
The dissenting view is a form of tortured logic. Holding that stare
decisis dictates the outcome in June Medical, but that the precedential
effect of the opinion was only those aspects of Whole Woman’s Health
that aligned with the Casey undue burden standard, rather than the
entire Whole Woman’s Health opinion. The dissent supported this
position by highlighting the Chief Justice’s disdain for the holding of
Whole Woman’s Health. However, the doctrine of stare decisis does
not allow for cherry-picking.151
Stare decisis means literally to “stand by things decided.” A
doctrine intended on preserving precedent and limiting judicial review
to “avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts” 152 should not be so
selective to allow even the Chief Justice to state he is adhering to
Whole Woman’s Health and in the same opinion effectively overrule
it.153 Even though Chief Justice Roberts stated that stare decisis has its
150

June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2134, 2139 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Box, 991 F.3d at 749 (Kanne, J., dissenting) (“Among other things, Chief
Justice Roberts stressed that “[s]tare decisis principles ... determine how we handle a
decision that itself departed from the cases that came before it. In those instances,
‘[r]emaining true to an “intrinsically sounder” doctrine established in prior cases
better serves the values of stare decisis than would following’ the recent departure.”)
152 June Medical, 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
153 See Murray supra, note 53 at 326 (“Taken together, the dissents by Justices
Alito and Gorsuch took a dim view of Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to stare
decisis. Both dissents argued that Chief Justice Roberts’s characterization of Whole
Woman’s Health was a legal fiction — a remade ruling utterly inconsistent with the
actual holding in Whole Woman’s Health.”
151
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limits and recognized that the principles of stare decisis are also used
to determine how the Court handles a decision that itself departed
from the cases that came before it, for the dissenting opinion to be
true, it would mean “Chief Justice Roberts’s respect for precedent
depended entirely on identifying only the parts of past decisions that
he wished to follow.”154 Justice Gorsuch expressly called out the Chief
Justice for this incongruency in his June Medical dissent, stating,
“whatever else respect for stare decisis might suggest, it cannot
demand allegiance to a nonexistent ruling inconsistent with the
approach actually taken by the Court.”155
Using the Marks Rule, the majority opinion correctly rejected the
possibility of such a discordant outcome by dismissing portions of the
concurrence going beyond stare decisis as dicta having nothing to do
with supporting the judgment. 156 The majority, in this instance, refused
to do the Supreme Court’s dirty work for them. 157 If the Supreme
Court wants to overrule any abortion jurisprudence, it must do so
minimally with a five-to-four vote.
However, it appears the doctrine of stare decisis has become a
stand-in for a more fraught conversation about the future of abortion
rights.158 To date, legislative and political efforts to take away abortion
rights, like Indiana’s with Act 404, have proved not to be entirely
successful. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed
the fundamental right to abortion on the grounds of stare decisis. Still,
it continues to minimally tinker with the standard, handing down a
confusing precedent for the lower courts to apply. To date, the core

154

See id. at 308.
June Medical, 140 S. Ct. 2154–57 (Alito, J., dissenting). (Justice Alito
noted that, even as the Chief Justice “stresses the importance of stare decisis . . . he
votes to overrule Whole Woman’s Health insofar as it changed the Casey test.”)
156 See Box, 991 F.3d at 749(“[The Marks Rule] does not allow dicta in a nonmajority opinion to overrule an otherwise binding precedent.”)
157 See id. at 746. (We simply do not survey non-majority opinions to count
likely votes and boldly anticipate overruling of Supreme Court precedents. That is
not our job.)
158 See Murray supra, note 53 at 309.
155
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holding of Roe stubbornly survived all of these proposed challenges159
because none of the stare decisis factors are present; if anything,
evidence shows that abortion rights and the healthcare interests that go
along with those rights are still very prevalent. Nevertheless, that does
not stop the Supreme Court from taking on abortion cases and
dragging the nation through another parade of hysterics.
THE JUNE MEDICAL PLURALITY HIGHLIGHTS A LARGER
ISSUE WITH THE SUPREME COURT’S ABORTION
JURISPRUDENCE
The constitutional right to abortion is still timely and heavily
relied upon by those who need abortion rights the most.160
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s continued involvement in the right
to abortion is causing more harm than good. The uncertainty stemming
from the latest decision with June Medical creating a circuit split and a
lack of uniformity in the right to abortion is a prime example.
However, the Supreme Courts’ involvement in the abortion debate is
far from over. The Supreme Court again will add to its abortion
jurisprudence on December 1, 2021, when it hears Dobbs v.
159See

id.
See, e.g., Jill E. Adams & Melissa Mikesell, And Damned If They Don't:
Prototype Theories to End Punitive Policies Against Pregnant People Living in
Poverty, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 283, 312 (2017) (“By urging us to consider the
discriminatory effects of government practices on particular groups, [Obergefell's]
articulation of ‘equal dignity’ provides a new way to challenge Medicaid abortion
coverage bans ....”); see also Gerdts C, et al. Side Effects, Physical Health
Consequences, and Mortality Associated with Abortion and Birth After an Unwanted
Pregnancy. Women’s Health Issues 26:55-9 (2016). Limiting young women’s access
to abortion does not ensure that abortions will not continue. It only ensures that
abortions will be less safe; Nour N.M. An Introduction to Maternal Mortality. REV.
OBSTET. GYNECOL. 1, 77–81 (2008). (States with stricter abortion ban laws have the
highest rates of neonatal mortality. Facts show in the absence of abortion rights,
more women and babies are going to get sick, be poor, and die. Additionally, these
stricter abortion laws show no improvements in preventing sexual activity or
unintended pregnancies.) Yet, the Supreme Court opinions do not consider these
realities and may soon not even consider the benefits of an abortion restriction as
compared to the burdens a restriction places on abortion.
160
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Jackson.161 Making it clear that the Supreme Court will continue to do
this seemingly “endless dance of determining whether a law unduly
burdens a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion” 162 and force lower
courts to do the same.163 While Dobbs might resolve this circuit split
as to discrepancy of the abortion standard in June Medical,164 the June
Medical plurality highlights an ongoing issue that will not resolve
itself come December 1, 2021. The issue of the Supreme Court
continuing to grant certiorari for facially unconstitutional cases where
it is clear the stare decisis principles they so heavily rely on during
abortion challenges are not present, stimulating controversy and
unreliability around abortion rights.165
The evidence shows that the abortion decisions handed down by
the Supreme Court have lasting effects on American citizens.
Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court keeps taking on abortion
cases and handing down unsatisfying and confusing compromises, just
as the Court did in June Medial, frustrating the American people on
both sides of the abortion debate. Placing a woman’s right to abortion
in the hands of nine justices has gotten this country exactly where we
started in 1973: politically, even if not socially, divided. Rather than
continue the same cycle, legislatures, policymakers, and the courts
161See

Dobbs, S. Ct. 2619.
Box, 141 S. Ct. at 188.
163 See id.
164 Patrick Murray, National: Public Pans Texas Abortion Law Most say leave
Roe v. Wade as is, Monmouth University Polling Institute (2021) (According to
Monmouth University’s poll 62 per cent of Americans said that the decision in Roe v
Wade, which protected abortion as a right, should remain in place)
165See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Symposium: Party of Five? Setting the Table for
Roe v. Wade, SCOTUSBLOG (July 24, 2019, 3:18 PM) (That the Court granted
review in June Medical Services was perhaps surprising, given that it had considered
the constitutionality of an almost identical statute only a few years earlier. For some,
the fact that four votes could be mustered to grant certiorari under these unusual
circumstances suggested that one wing of the Court was especially eager to revisit
the question of abortion rights.); David G. Savage, A Supreme Court Retreat from
Roe vs. Wade Could Begin This Week with Louisiana Abortion Case, L.A. TIMES
(2020) (“For the first time, the court appears to have a majority of conservative
justices inclined to sharply limit abortion rights or overturn Roe vs. Wade entirely.”)
162
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must stop looking at abortion as a right of choice, uncoupled from
access to healthcare and public health. Unfortunately, the current make
up of the abortion debate leaves out three critical parties healthcare,
evidence-based research, and the American people’s wishes.
Perhaps the Supreme Court is no longer the best equipped
institution to weigh the right to abortion and should leave the standard
as is. Unlike the legislatures and the courts, public health and health
care systems across the country have experience, expertise, and data
surrounding reproductive health and healthcare. Yet, these public
health organizations and health systems in various states will be
blocked from reproductive health if the right to abortion continues to
change or go away.
Abortion politics does not even consider the participation or views
of the American people anymore. Most American people take a
middle-of-the-road approach to abortion, believing there should be a
right to abortion even if that right is not unlimited166, and feel the
standard should be left alone. But the majority of American people—
the moderate voices on this issue—are being forgotten in this pointless
partisan war. Even if most Americans take the “pro-choice” position
over the “pro-life,” the Democrat and Republican parties are polarized,
and U.S. institutions, like the Supreme Court, keep the pot boiling,
ensuring the battles will continue. 167
The abortion debate has yet to hit its breaking point in state
politics and judicial appointments. As the Supreme Court takes on yet
another abortion case this term, all entities need to realize that
legislative attacks on the right to abortion attack the right to
healthcare. They are not separate. 168 Therefore, maybe it is the
Supreme Court’s time to send the message that the abortion standard is
static and effectively remove itself from the abortion debate to stop the
controversy. If the Court is ill-positioned to handle this issue, they

166

Murray supra note 158 at 3.
See Andy Schmookler: The GOP: false 'friend' of anti-abortion Americans,
N. VA. DAILY (2021).
168 Roe, 410 at 165-66.
167
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should stop trying and leave it to rest.169 However, that seems unlikely.
Sadly, for the American people, the end to the abortion debate, fiftyplus years later, is still not in sight.

169

Lindgren, supra note 160 at 405.
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